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Identifying dependability 
requirements for space software 
systems
Abstract:  Computer  systems  are  increasingly  used  in  space,  whether  in 
launch vehicles, satellites, ground support and payload systems. Software 
applications used in these systems have become more complex, mainly due 
to the high number of features to be met, thus contributing to a greater 
probability of hazards related to software faults. Therefore, it is fundamental 
that the specification activity of requirements have a decisive role in the 
effort of obtaining systems with high quality and safety standards. In critical 
systems  like  the  embedded  software  of  the  Brazilian  Satellite  Launcher, 
ambiguity,  non-completeness,  and  lack  of  good  requirements  can  cause 
serious accidents with economic, material and human losses. One way to 
assure quality with safety, reliability and other dependability attributes may 
be the use of safety analysis techniques during the initial phases of the project 
in order to identify the most adequate dependability requirements to minimize 
possible fault or failure occurrences during the subsequent phases. This 
paper presents a structured software dependability requirements analysis 
process that uses system software requirement specifications and traditional 
safety analysis techniques. The main goal of the process is to help to identify 
a set of essential software dependability requirements which can be added to 
the software requirement previously specified for the system. The final results 
are more complete, consistent, and reliable specifications.
Keywords: dependability, software systems, requirements, space computer 
systems, criticality analysis.
INTRODUCTION
The aerospace systems, which involve critical software, 
are  increasingly  complex  due  to  the  great  number  of 
requirements  to  be  satisfied,  which  contributes  to  a 
higher  probability  of  hazards  and  risks  in  a  project. 
Taking  the  reports  of  international  space  accidents  as 
experience,  most  problems  caused  by  software  were 
related to requirements and to the misunderstanding of 
what it should do (Leveson, 2004). Lutz (1992), having 
examined  387  software  errors  during  integration  and 
system tests of the Voyager and Galileo spacecraft, found 
that most errors were caused by discrepancies between 
the documented requirements and the implementation of 
the functioning system. Another identified problem was 
the misunderstanding about the interface of the software 
with the rest of the system. All the reports of accidents are 
related to improper specification practices.
Regarding  the  Brazilian  scenario,  there  is  no  official 
reporting of space accidents involving software problems. 
However, as the complexity of space computer systems 
increases with an equivalent raise of presence of functions 
implemented by software, there is an increased risk of 
accidents that can be caused by problems in computer 
system development. According to the recommendations 
of the Brazilian Satellite Launcher VLS-1 V03 accident 
investigation (DEPED, 2004), the technical commission 
proposes  that  the  safety  and  quality  issues  should  be 
improved as a necessary condition for the continuation of 
the project. 
Problems  related  to  requirements  such  as  ambiguity, 
non-completeness  and  even  the  lack  of  non-functional 
requirements should be minimized during the development 
of space computer systems. Thus, a set of dependability 
attributes could be used as a start point to define most 
adequate  non-functional  requirements  to  minimize  the 
possible fault or failure occurrences in the engineering 
phase of the requirements.
For this work, dependability is the property of a computer 
system  to  provide  its  services  with  confidence,  and 
dependability attributes are the parameters by which 
the dependability of a system is evaluated (Barbacci et 
al., 1995). During the development of space computer 
systems, it is necessary to give relevant importance to 
security,  safety,  reliability,  performance,  quality  and 
other dependability attributes. It is believed that the 
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use of these attributes helps the identification of non-
functional  requirements  to  be  incorporated  into  the 
system, improving its quality assurance and helping to 
minimize the risk levels both in hardware and software 
parts.
This  paper  presents  the  dependability  requirements 
analysis  process  for  space  software  systems  (called  in 
this  work  as  DEPROCESS)  (Romani,  2007),  which  is 
based on a dependability attribute set and software safety 
analysis techniques, selected according to space standards 
such as the European Space Agency (ESA), the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Brazilian Space Agency 
(AEB), and other approaches of well known researchers 
in this area.
First,  the  DEPROCESS  is  presented,  emphasizing  the 
project phase where it is applied and its steps with the 
activities  to  be  executed.  Also  in  this  section,  safety 
analysis techniques and dependability attributes used in 
the process are mentioned. Then, a case study applied 
in  embedded  software  used  in  a  hypothetical  space 
vehicle is presented. The idea is to show the application 
of the process in a functional requirement related to the 
vehicle inertial system, which has an important role in its 
mission. Finally, there are some considerations about the 
application of the process  the software requirement that 
was analyzed, and conclusions with recommendations for 
improving the process are reported.
THE DEPROCESS APPROACH
The DEPROCESS purpose is to identify dependability 
requirements at the beginning of software projects using 
safety analysis techniques (PHA, SFTA and SFMECA) 
and  a  dependability  attributes  classification  (such  as 
availability,  reliability,  safety,  and  others)  specifically 
applied to the space area.
According  to  the  lifecycle  project  phases  proposed  by 
ESA  (2009a),  the  DEPROCESS  is  applied  after  the 
“system engineering related to software” and before the 
“software requirements” and “architecture engineering” 
processes. As the input, it uses the system requirements 
specified for software, and the output is a set of software 
dependability  requirements  which  must  be  discussed 
during  the  Preliminary  Design  Review  (PDR),  for  the 
analysis of their viability and effective incorporation to 
the  software  in  the  software  requirement  specification 
document.
The  DEPROCESS  is  composed  by  four  steps,  whose 
activities are applied to each requirement as described in 
Fig. 1.
A project criticality rate must be specified for the whole 
project as a way to define the extension of the application 
of  the  process.  This  extension  can  vary  according  to 
the strategic conditions of the project, like the available 
resources, the execution schedule, and other information 
that should be evaluated. This case study was based on 
NASA criticality scale (NASA, 2005a) (Table 1).
Assign a criticality rate 
for the requirement 
Meet the project 
criticality rate? 
Apply the safety analysis techniques
Identify the dependability attributes
Yes 
No 
Step 1 
Step 2 
Step 3 
Step 4 
DEPROCESS
Software System Requirements 
(Requirement 1…n) 
Software Dependability Requirements 
Requirement n? 
Yes 
No 
Figure 1:  Dependability  requirements  analysis  process  for 
space software systems (DEPROCESS).
Table 1:  Criticality scale and its effects
Criticality Effect
1 Minor or negligible
2 Significant degradation
3 Subsystem loss
4 Significant loss or degradation of mission
5 Major loss or degradation of mission
6 Complete loss of mission
The sequence of the DEPROCESS four-step execution 
for each studied requirement is as follows:
1.  assign a criticality rate for each requirement: in this 
step, a criticality rate  is attributed for each software 
system  requirement,  based  on  the  results  of  the 
interviews  with  the  project  specialists,  in  order  to 
compare the requirement criticality rate to the project 
criticality rate.
2.  select if the requirement will be analyzed: in this step, 
it is decided if the requirement will be submitted to 
the application of the safety analysis techniques. It is 
carried out by comparing the requirement criticality 
rate with the project criticality rate before the start of Identifying dependability requirements for space software systems
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the application of the process. In case the requirement 
is not selected (requirement criticality rate < project 
criticality  rate),  it  does  not  need  a  dependability 
analysis.
3.  apply  the  safety  analysis  techniques:  in  this  step, 
the requirement is submitted to the safety analysis 
techniques PHA, SFTA and SFMECA, considering 
the  software  interface  requirements,  functional 
requirements,  performance  requirements,  safety 
requirements, and so on. As a support to this activity, 
keywords  (NASA,  2005b)  can  be  useful  to  find 
potential fault events and failure modes due to not 
meeting the requirement.
4.  identify  the  dependability  attributes:  in  this  step, 
the dependability attributes are identified. They are 
obtained through the comparison of the results of SFTA 
and SFMECA techniques as to the potential system 
fault  events/failure  modes.  These  dependability 
attributes  will  be  recommended  as  dependability 
requirements  to  minimize  the  occurrence  of  fault/
failure  related  to  each  analyzed  requirement.  The 
dependability requirements shall be evaluated during 
the PDR and those considered more relevant must be 
incorporated into software requirement specification 
document.
DEPENDABILITY EVALUATING TECHNIQUES 
FOR THE DEPROCESS
In  the  third  step  of  DEPROCESS,  the  safety  analysis 
techniques  are  applied  to  identify  the  potential  fault 
events  and  failure  modes,  which  will  be  used  to  help 
the identification of the attributes and the dependability 
requirements.
These techniques were selected according to two criteria:
1.  comparative survey of the safety analysis techniques 
according  to  international  and  Brazilian  standard 
institutions (NASA, 2005a; NBR 14857-2), shown in 
Table 2, and consideration of well proved techniques 
used  in  accident  investigations  and  also  their 
predictive analysis (DEPED, 2004; Leveson, 1995; 
Camargo Junior, Almeida Junior, Melnikof, 1997).
2.  selection of the specific techniques for software, like 
SFTA  and  SFMECA,  considering  also  the  studies 
previously carried out in the software for the Brazilian 
space vehicles (IAE, 1994; Reis Filho, 1995). Then, 
the  following  safety  analysis  techniques  have  been 
chosen: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Software 
Fault  Tree  Analysis  (SFTA)  and  Software  Failure 
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA).
According to NASA (2005a), PHA identifies and classifies 
regarding to severity that potential hazards associate to the 
mission due to not meeting the analyzed requirement. SFTA 
is a “top-down” analysis, working from hazard (top event) 
to possible causes (basic events), using AND and OR logic 
gates to connect the events; while SFMECA is a “bottom-
up” analysis searching the failure modes of each function, 
their effects while they propagate through the system, and 
the hazard criticality rate at the upper level.
When used together, SFTA and SFMECA allow finding 
possible  failure  modes  and  areas  of  interest,  which 
cannot be found by applying only one technique. This 
bi-directional  analysis  can  provide  limited  assurances. 
Nevertheless, they are essential to assure that the software 
has  been  systematically  examined,  and  that  it  satisfies 
the  safety  requirement  for  software.  However,  during 
the beginning stages of software development, like the 
requirement phase, only a preliminary safety analysis can 
be executed.
DEPENDABILITY ATTRIBUTES 
IDENTIFICATION FOR THE DEPROCESS
In this work, in order to achieve an appropriate set of 
dependability attributes for space computer systems as a 
whole, all attributes related to the components that interact 
with the hardware, the software, or that have some kind 
of dependency relation were considered. As proposed by 
Firesmith  (2006)  it  was  defined  an  attribute  hierarchy 
composed by quality factors with common concepts and 
related  processes.  These  dependability  attributes  were 
classified  in  three  groups:  defensibility,  soundness  and 
quality.  
These attributes are also results of researches (Romani, 
2007;  Lahoz,  2009),  and  based  on  Brazilian  and 
Table 2:  Safety analysis techniques used by aerospace and defense institutions
Techniques/
Institutions
FMEA/
FMECA
FTA SFMECA SFTA HSIA PHA SCCFA
ESA X X X X X X X
NASA X X X X - X -
MOD X - - X - - -
AEB X X - X - X -Romani, M.A.S., Lahoz, C.H.N., Yano, E.T.
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international  standard  institutions  (NBR  14959;  MOD, 
2003;  ESA,  2004;  NASA,  2005a),  as  well  as  studies 
related to the dependability of some authors in the area 
(Kitchenham and Pfleeger, 1996; Camargo Junior, Almeida 
Junior and Melnikof, 1997; Firesmith, 2003 and 2006; Rus, 
Komi-Sirvio and Costa, 2003; Sommerville, 2004). The 
definitions of dependability attributes selected in this work 
are presented in section Glossary, at the end of this paper.
Figure 2 shows the hierarchy created for the dependability 
attributes selected for space computer systems.
errors, accumulated during its flight, leading it to follow 
an unexpected trajectory, and the insertion of the satellite 
out of the desired orbit. An inaccurate value was one of 
the causes of the accident with Ariane 5 launcher in 1996 
(Leveson, 2009). The precision of the navigation software 
in  the  flight  control  computer  (on-board  computer) 
depends on the precision of the inertial reference system 
measurements,  but  in  the  Ariane  system  test  facility 
this precision could not be achieved by the electronics 
creating the test signals. The precision of the simulation 
may be further reduced because the base period of the 
inertial reference system is 1 versus 6 miliseconds in the 
simulation at the system test facility.
Availability
Availability  may  be  calculated  as  a  function  of  mean 
time to failure (MTTF) and mean time to repair (MTTR). 
One  example  cited  by  Fortescue,  Stark  and  Swinerd 
(2003) is that for a “service” type spacecraft, such as the 
telephony/television communications satellite, down time 
or “unavailability” constitutes loss of revenue, and hence 
the  cost  benefits  of  design  improvements  to  increase 
reliability  can  be  optimized  against  their  impact  on 
revenue return. As another example, the lack of navigation 
data during a certain period of time of the vehicle control 
cycle can destabilize it, in such a way to cause the loss of 
the mission. Therefore, subsystems or components of the 
vehicle as the on-board computer, the inertial system and 
the data bus should be available to perform their functions 
in the moment they are requested. 
Completeness
The report of the fault that caused the destruction of the 
Mars Polar Lander during entry and landing stage in 2000 
says that the document of requirements at the system level 
did not specify the modes of failure related to possible 
transient effects to prematurely identify the touch of the 
ship on the ground. It is speculated that the designers 
of  the  software,  or  one  of  the  auditors  could  have 
discovered the missing requirement if they were aware 
of its rationale (Leveson, 2004). This demonstrates that 
the non-consideration of the completeness attribute in the 
requirements may lead to occurrence of a system failure.
Consistency
During  investigation  of  the American  launcher  Titan  IV 
Centaur  space  accident,  occurred  in  1999,  one  of  the 
causes found arose from the installation procedure of the 
inertial navigation system software, where the rolling rate 
Failure tolerance 
Safety 
Security 
Simplicity 
Survivability 
Robustness 
Availability
Completeness
Consistency
Correctness
Recoverability
Reliability
Self-description
Stability
Traceability
Accuracy
Efficiency
Maintainability 
Modularity
Portability
Testability
Defensibility  Soundness Quality 
Dependability
Figure 2:  Attributes  and  Dependability  hierarchy,  based  on 
Firesmith (2006).
In the “defensibility” branch, attributes are related to the 
way the system or its component can defend itself from 
accidents  and  attacks.  In  this  group,  failure  tolerance, 
safety, security, simplicity, survivability and robustness 
attributes were included.
In the “soundness” branch, attributes are related to the 
way  the  system  or  its  component  is  suitable  for  use. 
In  this  group,  availability,  completeness,  consistency, 
correctness,  recoverability,  reliability,  self-description, 
stability and traceability attributes were included.
In  the  “quality”  branch,  other  attributes  considered  as 
quality factors relevant to the system or its component 
were  classified.  In  this  group,  accuracy,  efficiency, 
maintainability,  modularity,  portability  and  testability 
attributes were included.
Following,  based  on  its  definitions,  the  relevance  of 
each dependability attribute selected for space computer 
systems is discussed.
Accuracy
An  inaccurate  value  resulting  from  the  calculation  of 
the logic of a spacecraft control may lead to insertion of Identifying dependability requirements for space software systems
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-0.1992476  was  placed  instead  of  -1.992476.  The  fault 
could  have  been  identified  during  the  pre-launch,  but 
the  consequences  were  not  properly  understood  and  the 
necessary corrections were not made because there was not 
a verification activity of critical data entry (Leveson, 2009).
Correctness
Leveson (2009) stated that in the Titan/Centaur accident, 
there  was  apparently  no  checking  of  the  correctness  of 
the software after the standard testing performed during 
development. For example, on the day of the launch, the 
attitude rates for the vehicle on the launch pad were not 
properly sensing the Earth’s rotation rate (the software was 
consistently reporting a zero roll rate) but no one had the 
responsibility to specifically monitor that rate data or to 
perform a check to see if the software attitude filters were 
operating correctly. In fact, there were no formal processes 
to check the validity of the filter constants or to monitor 
attitude rates once the flight tape was actually loaded into 
the Inertial Navigation Unit at the launch site. Potential 
hardware failures are usually checked up to launch time, 
but it may have been assumed that testing removed all 
software errors and no further checks were needed.
Efficiency
Control actions will, in general, lag in their effects on the 
process because of delays in signal propagation around 
the control loop: an actuator may not immediately respond 
to an external command signal (called dead time); the 
process may have delays in responding to manipulated 
variables  (time  constants)  and  the  sensors  may  obtain 
values  only  at  certain  sampling  intervals  (feedback 
delays).  Time  lags  restrict  the  speed  and  extent,  with 
which the effects of disturbances, both within the process 
itself and externally derived, can be reduced. They also 
impose extra requirements on the controller, for example, 
the need to infer delays that are not directly observable 
(Leveson,  2009).  Considering  a  real-time  software 
system, efficiency is a relevant attribute in the care of their 
temporal constraints, and is related to performance, as the 
checks from time response, CPU and memory usage. For 
example,  a  function  that  performs  the  acquisition  and 
processing of inertial data to the space vehicle control 
system must strictly comply with their execution time, to 
ensure proper steering of the spacecraft during its flight.
Failure tolerance
There  are  many  ways  in  which  data  processing  may 
fail  –  through  software  and  hardware,  and  whenever 
possible, spacecraft systems must be capable of tolerating 
failures (Pisacane, 2005). Failure tolerance is achieved 
primarily via hardware, but inappropriate software can 
compromise the system failure tolerance. During the real-
time software project, it is necessary to define a strategy 
to meet the system required level of failure tolerance. If 
it is well designed, the software can detect and correct 
errors in an intelligent way. NASA has established levels 
of failure tolerance based on two levels of acceptable risk 
severity:  catastrophic  hazards  must  be  able  to  tolerate 
two control failures and critical hazards must be able to 
tolerate a single control failure (NASA, 2000). Examples 
of  software  failure  are  the  input  and  output  errors  of 
sensors  and  actuators.  This  failure  could  be  tolerated 
by checking the data range and forcing the software to 
assume  an  acceptable  value. An  example  of  hardware 
failure in electronic components is the single-event upset 
(SEU),  an  annoying  kind  of  radiation-induced  failure. 
SEUs  and  their  effects  can  be  detected  or  corrected 
using some mitigation methods like error detection and 
correction (EDAC) codes, watchdog timers, fault rollback 
and watchdog processors.
Maintainability
It must be easy for space computer systems to maintain 
their  subsystems,  modules  or  components  during  any 
phase  of  the  mission,  whether  on  the  ground  or  in 
space.  The  purpose  of  maintenance  can  be  repair  a 
discovered error, or allow a system upgrade to include 
new features of improvements. As an example, one can 
cite  the  maintenance  remotely  performed  by  NASA 
on  Mars  Exploration  Rovers  Spirit  and  Opportunity, 
launched  toward  Mars  in  2003.  According  to  Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory site information (JPL, 2007), the 
communications with the Earth is maintained through the 
Deep Space Network (DSN), an international network 
of antennas that provide communication links between 
the  scientists  and  engineers  on  Earth  and  the  Mars 
Exploration Rovers in space and on Mars. Through the 
DNS, it was possible to detect a problem in the first weeks 
of  the  mission  that  affected  the  Spirit  rover  software, 
causing it to remain in silence for some time, until the 
engineers could fix the error. The failure was related to 
flash memory and it was necessary a software update to 
fix it. It was also noted that if the Opportunity rover had 
landed first, it would have the same problem.
Modularity
The partitioning of critical systems in modules provides 
advantages, such as easy maintainability and traceability 
of the design to code, and allows the distributed software Romani, M.A.S., Lahoz, C.H.N., Yano, E.T.
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development. Modularity contributes to the verification 
and validation process and errors detection during the unit, 
component and integration tests as well as maintenance 
activities. The modularity facilitates the failure isolation, 
preventing their spread to other modules. The independent 
development assists implementation and integration. As 
an example, a space software configuration item (ICSW) 
can be divided into software components (CSW), which 
can  be  divided  into  units  or  modules  (USW),  which 
correspond to the tasks to be performed during pre-flight 
and flight phases, in the interaction with the communication 
interfaces, sensors and actuators, and the transmission of 
data to the telemetry system.
Portability
The space software projects can be long-term and, during 
its  development,  there  may  be  situations  that  require 
technological changes to improve the application, and to 
overcome problems such as the exchange of equipment 
due  to  the  high  dependence  on  product  suppliers.  For 
example, it is desirable that the code can be compiled 
into  an ANSI  standard  in  the  space  software  systems. 
This will enable the code to be run on different hardware 
platforms  and  in  any  compatible  computer  system, 
making only specific adaptations to be transferred from 
one environment to another.
Reliability
The  reliability  of  Space  computer  systems  reliability 
depends  on  other  factors  like  correct  selection  of 
components,  correct  derating,  correct  definition  of  the 
environmental stresses, restriction of vibration and thermal 
transfer  effects  from  other  subsystems,  representative 
testing,  proper  manufacturing  and  so  on  (Fortescue, 
Stark and Swinerd, 2003). Reliability is calculated using 
failure rates, and hence the accuracy of the calculations 
depends on the accuracy and realism of our knowledge 
of failure mechanisms and modes. For most established 
electronic  parts,  failure  rates  are  well  known,  but  the 
same cannot be said for mechanical, electromechanical, 
and electrochemical parts or man. The author states that, 
in  modern  applications  in  which  computers  and  their 
embedded software are often integrated into the system, 
the reliability of the software must also be considered. 
One way to define acceptable reliability levels for space 
systems is by regulatory authorities and, in the case of 
components, by the manufacture industries. An example 
of a space system reliability case history was cited by 
Pisacane  (2005).  The  Asteroid  Rendezvous  (NEAR) 
spacecraft had a twenty-seven month development time, 
a  four-year  Cruise  to  the  asteroid,  and  spent  one  year 
in  orbit  about  the  asteroid  EROS. The  spacecraft  was 
successfully  landed  on  EROS  in  February  2001  after 
one year in orbit. Reliability was maximized by limiting 
the number of movable and deployable mechanical and 
electromechanical systems. 
Recoverability
In the autonomous embedded systems, i.e., that do not 
require human operators and interact with sensors and 
actuators, failures with severe consequences are clearly 
more damaging than those in which repair and recovery 
are simple (Sommerville, 2004). Therefore, the embedded 
computer systems must be able to recover themselves 
during the space mission situations where it is not possible 
to perform the maintenance.  As an example, in the execution 
of  a  embedded  software  during  the  unmanned  rocket 
flight, it is recommended that the function responsible for 
acquiring the data have a mechanism for recovery. In case 
of a failure, that does not allow the Inertial System data 
reading; it is necessary a recovery mechanism to provide 
this information to the control system so that the vehicle 
is not driven to a wrong trajectory.
Robustness
In addition to physically withstand the environment to 
which  they  will  be  submitted,  computer  systems  must 
also  be  able  to  deal  with  circumstances  outside  the 
nominal values, without causing the loss of critical data 
that undermine the success or safety of the mission. In 
case of hardware failure or software errors at run time, the 
system critical functions should continue to be executed. 
As an example of software robustness assessment, NASA 
(2000) mention fault injection, which is a dynamic-type 
testing because it must be used in the context of running 
software following a particular input sequence and internal 
state profile. In fault forecasting, software fault injection 
is used to assess the fault tolerance robustness of a piece 
of software (e.g., an off-the-shelf operating system).
Safety
According  to  Fortescue,  Stark  and  Swinerd,  (2003), 
the overall objective of the safety program is to ensure 
that  accidents  be  prevented  and  all  hazards  or  threats 
to people, the system and the mission be identified and 
controlled. Safety attribute is applied to all program phases 
and embrace ground and flight hardware, software and 
documentation. They also endeavor to protect people from 
man-induced hazards. In the case of manned spacecraft, 
safety  is  a  severe  design  requirement,  and  compliance Identifying dependability requirements for space software systems
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must be demonstrated prior to launch. Hazards can be 
classified  as  “catastrophic”,  “critical”  or  “marginal” 
depending on their consequences (loss of life, spacecraft 
loss, injury, damage etc.). Also, the most intensive and 
complete analysis can be carried out by constructing a 
safety fault tree. The software safety requirements should 
be  derived  from  the  system  safety  requirements  and 
should not be analyzed separately (ESA, 2009a). In the 
software space systems, an indicator of criticality for each 
module defining the level of associated risk, called safety 
integrity  level,  should  be  specified.  The  most  critical 
modules involve greater strictness in their development 
process (NASA, 2004a).
Security
Space systems have as a feature to protect information, 
due to the strategic interest of obtaining the technology 
of  satellite  launch  vehicles,  currently  still  dominated 
by few countries in the world. There should be a strict 
control  in  the  access  to  information  in  these  systems, 
because if a change occurs accidentally or maliciously, 
this can compromise the success of a mission. Barbacci 
et al. (1995) emphasizes that in government and military 
applications the disclosure of information was the primary 
risk that was to be averted at all costs. As an example 
of  the  influence  of  this  attribute,  a  remote  destruction 
command  of  a  spacecraft  launch  system  must  be  able 
to  block  another  command  maliciously  sent  from  an 
unknown source, which seeks to prevent the vehicle from 
being destroyed, when it violates the flight safety plan.
Self-description
Re-use of technology is common in the course of space 
programs, that is, many systems or subsystems are reused 
in subsequent missions, and so require maintenance or 
adjustments. To minimize the possibility of introducing 
errors  in  the  project,  it  is  desirable  that  the  computer 
system to be reused have a description that allows an easy 
understanding. For example, it is recommended that the 
code of a software application have comments that explain 
the operation of its functions, thus facilitating developers 
to carry out future required changes.
Simplicity
Simplicity is an essential aspect for the software used in 
critical systems, since the more complex the software, 
the greater the difficulty in assessing its safety (Camargo 
Junior, Almeida Junior and Melnikof, 1997). This is a 
desirable feature in a space software application because 
functions  with  simple  code  have  expected  operation 
and are therefore safer than others with difficulties in 
their understanding, which can produce indeterminate 
results. Software simplicity is also related to the ease 
of maintaining its code. For example, IV & V lessons 
learned from Mars Exploration Rover project (NASA, 
2004b)  provided  evidence  of  the  importance  of  this 
attribute. According to NASA report, portions of the file 
system using the system memory were very complex and 
modules have poor testability and maintainability. This 
factor contributed to a system level fault that put the 
Rover in a degraded communication state and allowed 
some unexpected commands. The file system was not the 
cause of the problem, but brought the lack of memory to 
light and created the task deadlock.
Stability
Space computer systems require high reliability, and their 
subsystems  and  components  must  continue  to  perform 
their  functions  within  the  specified  operational  level 
without  causing  the  interruption  of  service  provision 
during the mission, even if the system is operated for 
an extended period of time. Examples are the satellites 
that  depend  upon  the  performance  of  solar  cell  arrays 
for the production of primary power to support on-board 
housekeeping systems and payloads throughout their 7 
to 15 years operational lifetime in orbit. The positioning 
systems of solar panels must have stable operation during 
the  long-term  missions,  so  that  the  satellite  keeps  the 
solar cell arrays towards the sun when going through its 
trajectory.
Survivability
The  space  systems  are  designed  to  operate  in  an 
environment  with  different  features  from  those  on 
Earth,  such  as  extreme  gravity,  temperature,  pressure, 
vibration, radiation, EMI variations etc. Fortescue, Stark 
and Swinerd (2003) noted that the different phases in the 
life of a space system, namely, manufacture, pre-launch, 
launch  and  finally  space  operation,  have  their  own 
distinctive  features. Although  the  space  systems  spend 
the majority of their lives in space, it is evident that it 
must survive on other environments for complete success. 
Critical systems should continue to provide their essential 
services  even  if  they  suffer  accidental  or  malicious 
damage. This includes the system being able to resist to 
risks and threats, eliminating them or minimizing their 
negative effects, besides recognize accidents or attacks to 
allow a system reaction in case of their occurrence and 
recovery after the loss or degradation due to an accident 
or attack (Firesmith, 2003).Romani, M.A.S., Lahoz, C.H.N., Yano, E.T.
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Testability
A comprehensive spacecraft test program requires the 
use of several different types of facilities. These are 
required to fulfill the system testing requirements and 
may include some facilities like clean room, vibration, 
acoustic,  EMC,  magnetic  and  RF  compatibility 
(Pisacane,  2005).  In  the  case  of  a  critical  software 
system, this feature is crucial, especially during the unit 
test, integration, system and acceptance and validation 
phases (Camargo Junior, Almeida Junior and Melnikof, 
1997).  The  real-time  software  application  should  be 
tested as much as its functionality and its performance, 
ensuring  the  fulfillment  of  its  functions  during  the 
mission within the specified time.
Traceability
This  attribute  is  particularly  important  for  computer 
system requirements. In a software application, the code 
should  be  linked  to  the  requirement  that  originated  it, 
thus  enabling  the  verification  through  the  test  cases  if 
its specified functionalities were correctly implemented. 
This also represents the possibility of mapping the safety 
requirements in all system development phases.
Based  on  the  definitions  of  these  factors,  a  table  was 
elaborated.  It  generically  describes  the  potential 
fault  events  or  failure  modes  that  can  result  from  the 
application of the SFTA and SFMECA techniques and 
the corresponding dependability attributes recommended 
to minimize the occurrence of fault/failure. This table is 
used as a reference to execute the last DEPROCESS step, 
helping the analyst to identify the dependability attributes 
according  to  each  fault/failure  obtained.  Part  of  this 
reference table is presented in Table 3.
CASE STUDY
The  chosen  example  for  DEPROCESS  application 
was  the  requirement  of  “process  inertial  information 
necessary  to  the  control  algorithms  of  the  vehicle 
system”.  This  requirement  was  extracted  from  the 
Software System Specification document (SSS) and it 
is related to the control system of a space vehicle. This 
system has an inertial system (IS) that communicates, 
through a data bus (DB), with the on board computer 
(OBC),  to  periodically  provide  the  vehicle  position 
and instantaneous acceleration data. In order to acquire 
the IS data and their validation to be used by control 
algorithms,  a  software  function  called  ISDA  (Inertial 
System Data Acquisition) should be used and executed 
in less than 10 miliseconds.
In this case study example, the DEPROCESS was applied 
in the ISDA function. The lack of this function does not 
make possible the inertial data acquisition from the IS, 
not allowing the OBC to process the vehicle position and 
angular velocity calculations.
Table 3:  Correspondence  between  the  fault  events/failure 
modes and the dependability attributes
SFTA and SFMECA results Dependability attributes
Function omits some aspect 
in its implementation, which 
leads to the occurrence of a 
failure in its functioning.
Completeness
Function contains unverified 
errors, which leads to the 
occurrence of a failure in its 
functioning or performance.
Consistency
Function does not maintain 
a certain performance level 
specified in case of software 
failures or violation of the 
specified interfaces.
Failure tolerance
Function operates without 
of its designated temporal 
constraints.
Performance
Function faults generating 
incorrect/unexpected results 
or effects.
Precision
Function fails in the 
reestablishment of its 
performance level and in the 
recovery of the data directly 
affected.
Recoverability
Function whose source 
code does not allow 
easy understanding of its 
functioning.
Self-description
Function does not continue 
to satisfy certain critical 
requirements due to adverse 
conditions.
Survivability
Function was not correctly 
validated.
Testability
Function with its general 
safety requirements not 
mapped in the specification 
or in its respective 
implementation.
TraceabilityIdentifying dependability requirements for space software systems
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Applying the DEPROCESS steps, the following results 
were obtained:
1.  assign  a  criticality  rate  for  the  requirement:  for 
this case study, it was defined a criticality rate 6 
(complete loss of mission). The lack of information 
from the IS does not allow that the data related to 
position  be  correctly  processed,  which  can  leave 
the vehicle out of control and/or head it into an off-
nominal trajectory.
2.  select if the requirement will be analyzed: as this 
requirement  has  a  maximum  criticality  rate,  the 
next step was automatically executed. This means 
that the project criticality rate did not need to be 
considered.
3.  apply the safety analysis techniques:
3.1. PHA  –  the  PHA  identified  the  potential  hazard 
to  the  vehicle  system,  due  to  not  meeting  this 
requirement:  “vehicle  out  of  control  during  the 
flight”. Having the classification of NASA severity 
categories (ref. 8) as a reference, shown in Table 4, 
it was classified as category I (catastrophic).
3.2. SFTA – as shown below, the fault trees for the 
ISDA function are presented in Fig. 3, from the 
root (top event) and expanding until the leaf levels 
(pre-conditions to the top event occurrence).
3.3. SFMECA – as shown below, a SFMECA built 
for the ISDA function is presented in Table 5, 
according to a model proposed by ESA (2009b).
Table 4: Hazard severity definitions according to NASA
Hazard severity category Definitions
I – Catastrophic Loss of human life or 
permanent disability; loss 
of entire system; loss of 
ground facility; severe 
environmental damage.
II – Critical Severe injury or temporary 
disability; major system or 
environmental damage.
III – Moderate Minor injury; minor 
system damage.
IV – Negligible No injury or minor injury; 
some system stress, but no 
system damage.
Logic error in the 
ISDA function 
1.1 
Performance error in 
the ISDA function 
1.2 
Failure in the 
ISDA function 
1 
1.1.1
Implementation error in 
the ISDA function 
1.1.2 
Logic error in the 
ISDA function 
1.1 
ISDA function 
logic test did not 
detect the error 
1.2.1 1.2.2 
Performance error in 
the ISDA function 
1.2 
ISDA function 
performance test  
did not detect  
the error 
Timing error 
in the ISDA 
function 
Requirement 
design error in the 
ISDA function 
1.1.2.2
Implementation error in 
the ISDA function 
1.1.2 
Code error in the 
ISDA function 
1.1.2.1 
Figure 3:  FTA of the ISDA function.
Table 5: SFMECA worksheet for the ISDA function
Failure mode Failure cause Failure effect Criticality
Failure detection method/
Observable symptoms
Compensation
provisions
ISDA-1: no 
inertial data is 
acquired by the 
OBC (omission)
ISDA function 
not responding
No inertial data is 
acquired by the OBC 
to process the vehicle 
control algorithms
I Monitoring the function 
status/Data not received by 
the OBC
Create logic 
recovery 
mechanisms for 
the function
ISDA-2: error in 
the inertial data 
(null, corrupted, 
spurious, or 
incorrect value) 
acquired by the 
OBC
Failure during 
the execution 
of the ISDA 
function
Incorrect results 
in the calculations 
of the inertial 
information 
processed by the 
OBC
I Comparison of the previous 
inertial data with the 
current trajectory data at 
each instant/Trajectory data 
out of the specified limit
Create function 
logic test 
and  create 
fault tolerance 
mechanisms for 
incorrect values
ISDA-3: ISDA 
function with 
incorrect timing
ISDA function 
responding after 
the specified 
time
Inertial data 
acquired by the 
OBC out of time
II Verify the data input 
time in the OBC/Control 
actuators being activated 
out of the specified time
Create function 
performance testRomani, M.A.S., Lahoz, C.H.N., Yano, E.T.
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4.  Identify  the  dependability  attributes:  the 
dependability attributes for the ISDA function 
were identified by comparing the basic events 
obtained  in  SFTA  (step  3.2)  and  the  failure 
causes  obtained  in  SFMECA  (step  3.3)  with 
the list of potential fault events/failure modes 
(Table 3).
The recommended dependability requirements for this 
case study (Table 6) were based on the recommendations   
of NASA (2005b) and from some authors in the critical 
system area (Storey, 1996; Laplante, 2004).
The set of non-functional requirements extracted by the 
DEPROCESS must be discussed during the Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR), for the analysis of their viability 
and effective incorporation to the software project in the 
software requirement specification document.
Table 6: Attributes and dependability requirements for the ISDA function
Basic event (SFTA)/
Failure causes (SFMECA)
Identified attributes Recommended dependability requirements
Function logic test did not 
detect error/Failure during 
the execution of the ISDA 
function
- Consistency
- Testability
- Failure tolerance
- Verify critical commands before the transmission and after 
the reception of the data
- The function should be able to consist, in each time cycle, 
the IS acquired values
- Create “black box” test cases, exercising the different 
possible sets of inputs and testing the limit values
- Create “white box” test cases to verify the coverage of the 
commands, branches, and decisions in the function source code
- The function should be able to tolerate, within a predetermined 
time interval, incorrect values acquired by the IS
Code error in the function - Self-description
- Precision
- Create a complete, simple, concise, and direct 
documentation, and keep this information always updated
- Make available to the implementers a good program 
practice “check list”
Requirement design error 
in the function
- Completeness
- Traceability
- Specify the input and output data for the module and the 
data that are shared internally or with other modules
- List all possible failures inside the module or in the 
associated I/O devices. For each failure module, indicate how 
the failure can occur and how it can be detected and treated
Timing error in the 
function AND
Function performance test 
did not detect the error /
ISDA function responding 
out of the specified time
- Consistency
- Performance
- Testability
- Verify the function responding time, the CPU and memory 
use during the execution of the function
- Estimate function execution time counting its 
macroinstructions or measuring it using a logic analyzer to 
capture data or events
ISDA function not 
responding
- Survivability
- Recoverability
- Failure tolerance
- The function should be executed “n” times in case of failure 
in inertial data acquisition
- For extreme situations, return the program to the previous 
state considered safe (soft reset capacity or a watchdog timer)
As  the  SFTA  and  the  SFMECA  are  bidirectional 
techniques, in this case study it was possible to map 
the possible hazards in a detailed and complementary 
way. The compensation provisions presented through 
the  SFMECA  provided  some  information  that 
helped  to  define  the  recommended  dependability 
requirements.
CONCLUSIONS
It is important to point out that each project that will 
apply the DEPROCESS can be tailored to obtain the most 
effective  result.  For  example,  criticality  scale,  safety 
analysis techniques and dependability attributes set can 
be adjusted according to the technical features of the 
project. Besides, the previous knowledge about different 
safety techniques used by the organization should be Identifying dependability requirements for space software systems
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considered with DEPROCESS in order to facilitate the 
application  of the process and the acquisition of more 
significant  results.  The  set  of  dependability  attributes 
can and should be discussed and adapted according to 
the mission or project profile.
Other  relevant  factor  to  be  considered  during  the 
DEPROCESS  application  is  the  prioritization  of  the 
requirements to be analyzed. If the project criticality rate 
is very low, a huge set of requirements were selected, 
and  it  could  lead  to  the  impracticable  DEPROCESS 
application.
As  the  DEPROCESS  dependability  attributes 
identification is a qualitative approach, its interpretation 
is  subjective.  A  dependability  attribute  can  have 
different meanings depending on by whom it is being 
evaluated, or even on its importance in the project or 
in the organization. For instance, diverse interpretations 
for  the  “simplicity”  attribute  can  induce  different 
recommendations. One view of simplicity, in computer 
program  issues,  recommended  breaking  up  complex 
instructions.  Another  view  of  simplicity  argues  that 
segmented code instructions can lead to an increase of 
the code length, and consequently impact other quality 
attributes.  One  way  to  deal  with  this  subjectiveness 
interpretation would be mitigate it through more than 
one person applying the DEPROCESS and then compare 
the results to find out what dependability attributes have 
been identified in common.
Dependability attributes can be used to help identification 
and analysis of dependability requirements. The use of 
selected dependability attributes is an effective way to 
guide a requirement development team to discover and 
refine requirements. A dependability attribute persuades 
an analyst to focus on a dependability issue related to a 
functional requirement. As result, the analyst can discover 
new issues and identify requirements to deal with these 
new demands.
In conclusion, this paper presented a structured and 
systematic process that addresses the dependability, 
focused  on  software  systems  for  Brazilian  space 
vehicles.  Through  pre-established  criteria,  such  as 
the  criticality  rating  scale,  proper  safety  analysis 
techniques, and a set of dependability attributes, it 
was possible to generate some important information, 
such  as  the  dependability  requirements.  The 
purpose  of  these  recommendations  is  to  guarantee 
the  software  functioning,  and  also  the  preliminary 
survey  of  possible  vulnerable  points  that  should 
be investigated in the project as whole in order to 
improve its quality.
GLOSSARY
Accuracy
Software  attributes  that  demonstrate  the  generation  of 
results or correct effects or according to what has been 
agreed  upon  (Camargo  Junior,  Almeida  Junior  and 
Melnikof, 1997).
Availability
The ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required 
function under given conditions at a given instant of time 
or over a given time interval, assuming that the required 
external resources are provided (ESA, 2004).
Completeness
Software feature in which there is an omission on some 
aspect of its application which can cause the system to 
reach an unsafe state (Camargo Junior, Almeida Junior 
and Melnikof, 1997).
Consistency
Software feature to contain errors that are not checked, 
which can lead the system to an unsafe situation (Camargo 
Junior, Almeida Junior and Melnikof, 1997).
Correctness
The degree to which a work product and its outputs are 
free  from  defects  since  the  work  product  is  delivered 
(Firesmith, 2003).
Efficiency
It refers to timing aspects that are key factors in a critical 
system (Camargo Junior, Almeida Junior and Melnikof, 
1997).
Failure tolerance
Software attributes that demonstrate its ability to maintain 
a specified performance level in cases of software failures 
or violation in the specified interfaces (Camargo Junior, 
Almeida Junior and Melnikof, 1997).
Maintainability
The ability of an item, under given conditions of use, to be 
retained in, or restored to, a state in which it can perform 
a  required  function,  when  maintenance  is  performed 
under given conditions and using stated procedures and 
resources (ESA, 2004).
Modularity
Software  attributes  that  demonstrate  the  coupling 
degree,  i.e.,  interdependence  between  its  modules  and 
low cohesion, that is, the module includes two or more 
independent functions (Camargo Junior, Almeida Junior 
and Melnikof, 1997).Romani, M.A.S., Lahoz, C.H.N., Yano, E.T.
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Portability
A set of attributes that bear on the ability of software to 
be transferred from one environment to another, including 
the  organizational,  hardware  or  software  environment 
(Kitchenham, Pfleeger, 1996).
Reliability
The probability with which a spacecraft will successfully 
complete  the  specified  mission  performance  for  the 
required mission time (Fortescue, Stark, Swinerd, 2003).
The ability of an item to perform a required function 
under stated conditions for a specified period of time 
(MOD, 2003).
Recoverability
Software attributes that demonstrate its ability to restore 
its performance level and recover the data directly affected 
in case of failure and the time and effort necessary for it 
(ABNT, 2003).
Robustness
The degree to which a system or component can correctly 
function in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful 
environmental conditions (Rus, Komi-Sirvio and Costa, 
2003).
Safety
The possibility of catastrophic failure of systems in such 
a way as to compromise the safety of people or property, 
or result in mission failure (NASA, 2005a).
Security
Ability of the System to protect itself against accidental or 
deliberate intrusion (Sommerville, 2004).
Self-description
Software  attributes  that  allow  greater  facility  of  its 
understanding  and,  in  future  maintenance,  reduce  the 
possibility of introducing new errors (Camargo Junior, 
Almeida Junior and Melnikof, 1997).
Simplicity
Critical system software feature to facilitate its safety 
evaluation  (Camargo  Junior,  Almeida  Junior  and 
Melnikof, 1997).
Stability
The degree to which mission-critical services continue 
to be delivered during a given time period under a given 
operational profile regardless of any failures whereby 
the  failures  limiting  the  delivery  of  mission-critical 
services occur at unpredictable times and root causes 
of  such  failures  are  difficult  to  identify  efficiently 
(Firesmith, 2003).
Survivability
The  ability  of  a  computer-communication  system-
based  application  to  continue  satisfying  certain 
critical requirements (e.g., requirements for security, 
reliability, real-time responsiveness, and correctness) 
in  face  of  adverse  conditions  (Rus,  Komi-Sirvio, 
Costa, 2003).
Testability
Software attributes that demonstrate the effort needed to 
validate the modified software (NBR 14959).
Traceability
It  represents  the  possibility  that  all  the  general  safety 
requirements  are  perfectly  mappable  in  the  software 
specification and in its implementation (Camargo Junior, 
Almeida Junior and Melnikof, 1997).
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